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ESSAY
DEFENDING PROFILING WHILE COMBATING
RACISM: A COMPANION TO OGLETREE'S
'PRESUMPTION OF GUILT'
AMos N. JONES*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States of America, the presumption of innocence is
an essential bulwark against the injustice of arbitrariness, a liberty
safeguard entrenched in the common law.' "The principle that there
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement that lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law."2 Coexisting
with this presumption, officially endorsed racial profiling has become
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law, North Carolina Central University
School of Law. Fulbright Postgraduate Scholar (Australia) in the Centre for Comparative Con-
stitutional Studies and Visitor to the Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, 2006-07. J.D.,
2006, Harvard Law School. I appreciate the critical assessments of the foregoing thesis by Ran-
dall K. Johnson and the University of Chicago Law School Democrats, who invited me to engage
my topic with them in their monthly discussion forum on April 18, 2011. I am grateful for the
administration, faculty, staff, and students of North Carolina Central University's School of Law,
who safeguard an open-minded intellectual space for the generation of ideas. I thank the editors
of the North Carolina Central University Law Review for their diligence in publishing this essay.
1. Robert R. Rigg, 4 Ia. Prac., Criminal Law § 1:2 *note 7 (2010-11 ed.) (Exactly when this
presumption was, in precise words, stated to be a part of the common law is involved in doubt.
The writer of an able article in the North American Review (January, 1851), tracing the genesis
of the principle, says that no express mention of the presumption of innocence can be found in
the books of the common law earlier than the date of McNally's Evidence (1802). "How fully
the presumption of innocence had been evolved as a principle and applied at common law is
shown in McKinley's Case (1817) 33 State Tr. 275, 506, where Lord Gillies says: 'It is impossible
to look at it [a treasonable oath which it was alleged that McKinley had taken] without sus-
pecting, and thinking it probable, it imports an obligation to commit a capital crime. That has
been and is my impression. But the presumption in favor of innocence is not to be redargued by
mere suspicion. I am sorry to see, in this information, that the public prosecutor treats this too
lightly. He seems to think that the law entertains no such presumption of innocence. I cannot
listen to this. I conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which has
reason and religion and humanity for a foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed in
indelible characters in the heart of every judge and juryman, and I was happy to hear from Lord
Hermand he is inclined to give full effect to it. To overturn this, there must be legal evidence of
guilt, carrying home a decree of conviction short only of absolute certainty."')
2. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). See also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S.
233 (1977), Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 453, (1985); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710
(2003).
187
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a hotly contested law-enforcement mechanism over the last three de-
cades, identified by Cornel West in the 1990s as sociologically prob-
lematic,' systematically attacked by the Rev. Al Sharpton as
inherently racist,' and litigated by a cadre of talented personal-injury
lawyers as unconstitutional.'
In The Presumption of Guilt: The Arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr.
and Race, Class, and Crime in America (hereinafter "Presumption of
Guilt"), the prolific legal theorist Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., contextual-
izes a perverse tendency on the part of law enforcement within the
ever evolving contemporary framework of police affronts against Af-
rican Americans, including racial profiling.6 Responding to the "need
to examine our criminal justice system to ensure that fairness, not
power, is the currency of our system," the author takes as his unit of
analysis his Harvard faculty colleague and client's July 16, 2009, arrest
by the Cambridge Police Department under the authority of Sgt.
James Crowley.'
The salient facts from the incontrovertible record of that arrest are
simply as follows:
On that day, Sgt. Crowley responded to a call about a possible break-
in. The eyewitness informed a police dispatcher that one suspect
might have been Hispanic but provided no information indicating that
an African American was involved and even expressed some doubt as
to whether a break-in was in fact occurring, speculating that perhaps a
resident was simply struggling to open his own door. Professor Gates
was approached by Sgt. Crowley shortly after entering his home. Af-
ter informing the officer that he lived at 17 Ware Street and producing
both his Harvard University identification and his Massachusetts
driver's license with his photo and address on it, Gates was arrested.
He was, to put it simply, presumed to be guilty of a crime rather than
presumed to be a resident in his own home telling the truth about who
he was."8
What Ogletree, who is a distinguished civil rights advocate and former
public defender, provides in his book is a critically informed answer to
the question "but why?"
3. See JOHN MORRISON AND JACK MORRISON, CORNEL WEST (AFRICAN AMERICAN
LEADERS) 71 (2003).
4. See Id. Cf. Vasugi V. Ganeshanathan, Sharpton Sounds Off on Racial Profiling, THE
(HARVARD) CRIMSON, Nov. 23, 1999 ("The Reverend Al Sharpton urged students to protest
racial profiling in a speech last night at Lowell Lecture Hall . . . .'This issue has cut across all
racial lines,' Sharpton said. 'There is nothing more stressful than being black in America, where
you are victimized by cops and robbers."').
5. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE PRESUMPTION OF GuILT: THE ARREST OF HENRY
Louis GATES JR. AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA 106-09 (2010).
6. See Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 10.
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Ogletree's work suggests manifold reasons why so many innocent
black Americans, particularly black men, have found themselves tem-
porarily or permanently criminalized by law-enforcement officials,
and this essay affirms all of Ogletree's findings as to the existence of
the presumption of guilt with regard to blacks and how this presump-
tion frustrates all efforts to achieve more respect between citizens and
law enforcement.' As a threshold matter, it accepts his characteriza-
tion of what happened to Gates and why.' 0 However, while relying on
Ogletree's excellent analyses, the essay goes beyond the book. Cate-
gorizing some of the most dramatic true stories and data adduced in
the work, the essay identifies an important dynamic that is too often
unaddressed though self-evident in conversations and thinking about
the topic of racial profiling: the tension between the long-established
necessity and value of affirming responsible profiling in general while
continuing to combat the deadly racism that is endemic in American
law enforcement from the traffic-cop level all the way through the
ranks of our most esteemed federal prosecutors and courts." The es-
say seeks to embolden the discourse around the issue to include a
space for calling racism racism while also availing non-racist access to
a powerful law-enforcement approach that can be appropriate and
helpful to fighting crime in all communities.
Section I establishes the definitions of racial profiling and clarifies
their relationships to a distinct problem with which profiling has been
too extensively conflated in informal discussions, including many of
the 100 vignettes in Presumption of Guilt's long Epilogue, "100 Ways
to Look at Black Man," which comprises roughly one half of the
book:' invidious racial discrimination, also known as racism. Section
II applies the definitions of racial profiling and racism to some of the
more powerful testimonials and police records featured in Presump-
tion of Guilt, categorizing various methods of law enforcement and
aligning on policy and empirical grounds with the position that profil-
ing, when undertaken properly, is a positive approach that even black
political leaders have tacitly endorsed because of its positive impact
on black communities in the aggregate.
In the final analysis, the essay declares profiling, where practiced
appropriately, as a potential benefit for blacks and all other American
9. See Id. at 65 (explaining "there was no place in America where African Americans
could receive what the law guarantees to its White citizens: a presumption of innocence.").
10. See Id. at 15-40 for Ogletree's characterization of the events.
11. For a comprehensive treatment of the effects of this pervasive bias, see ANGELA DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECITTOR 40 (2007) ("It's easier to
simply go forward with the prosecution than engage in the thorny exercise of confronting the
very police officers on whom they rely to successfully prosecute their cases.").
12. See OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 204-05 for my own encounter with racial prejudice at
Lincoln Center.
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groups, rather than as a kind of albatross preventing discrete minori-
ties from attaining their hard-won civil rights and liberties. It suggests
a policy of racially profiling white motorists in those areas where data
indicate that they are disproportionately likely to be breaking the law.
The essay thereby serves to augment the record underlying the contin-
uous calls for an end to the never-defensible racism in American po-
licing that has stubbornly endured since the founding of the Republic,
the kind that has saddled black men in America with a damnable and
unconstitutional presumption of guilt.
The essay closes with an affirmation of the possibilities that inhere
in Ogletree's unique contribution in "Presumption of Guilt:" more
than 100 individuated accounts. It is hoped that these stories can ani-
mate the discussion of when racial profiling is appropriate versus
when racial profiling crosses the line and becomes racism, and how
aggregate data must inform law-enforcement policy and policing prac-
tices in drawing that subtle but necessary distinction.
I. RACIAL PROFILING AND RACISM DEFINED
This essay need not break ground with regard to either the necessity
of establishing definitions in this area of law or selecting the best defi-
nitions, for Professors Ramirez and her two co-authors already have
done so in their ground-breaking 2003 American Criminal Law Re-
view article Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World:
It is evident that the definition one chooses will determine one's
perception of the scope of the problem and the need for a response to
it. Therefore, to better understand and address the issue of racial pro-
filing, courts, law enforcement agencies, community groups, and schol-
ars must clearly define "racial profiling" and determine what role race
should play in law enforcement actions. Over the last decade, two
very different definitions of "racial profiling" have emerged, one nar-
row and one broad, both attempting to define the law enforcement
practice of using race as part of the calculus in determining whom to
question, stop, or search.
Under the narrow definition, racial profiling occurs when a law en-
forcement action is based on the race of the suspect, so that race is the
sole criterion for questioning, stopping, or searching a suspect. Rely-
ing on this narrow definition, virtually all law enforcement agencies
can honestly say that, as a matter of policy, they do not engage in
racial profiling and direct their officers not to engage in it. During the
era of Jim Crow, there were police departments in this country that
engaged in this form of racial profiling. While there may be some that
still do, such a department would be the rare exception rather than the
rule. Similarly, there certainly continue to be individual police officers
who will stop a young black male solely because that person is young
and black and either driving or walking in a white community, but few
4
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of them would concede that the stop was based solely on the race of
the suspect. In short, this narrow definition defines away the problem
of racial profiling by limiting it to the relatively rare instance when
race, by itself, is the sole basis for the stop or search. As Professor
Randall Kennedy has often observed, even the most racist police of-
ficers do not act solely on the basis of race; other factors ordinarily
also come into play. However, by allowing race to be one factor
among many, courts have, in effect, adopted this narrow definition.
According to the broader definition, racial profiling occurs when a
law enforcement officer relies upon race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion as one of several factors in determining whom to stop, search,
or question. Under this definition, racial profiling occurs whenever
race is part of the calculus of suspicion, which may include other fac-
tors such as gender, age, general appearance, and behavior. "Properly
understood, ... racial profiling occurs whenever police routinely use
race as a negative signal that, along with an accumulation of other
signals, causes an officer to react with suspicion." Under this defini-
tion, the use of race as one of many factors need not be conscious; it
may be the unconscious product of racial stereotyping. Consequently,
with this definition, racial profiling includes actions by law enforce-
ment officers who are acting in good faith, and who believe sincerely
that they are not using race as a factor but who in reality are uncon-
sciously making inferences as to criminal behavior that rely on little
more than generalized racial stereotypes. 3
Ultimately, Ramirez and her co-authors propose - and I adapt for the
purposes of this and future discussions on policing - a definition
whose terms bridge the divide between the narrow and the broad defi-
nition.14 Generally, those authors assert, racial profiling is the inap-
propriate1 5 use of race, ethnicity, or national origin, rather than
behavior or individualized suspicion, to focus on an individual for ad-
ditional investigation; the use of race is not inappropriate if law en-
forcement has specific, concrete evidence linking race to a particular
person or particular criminal incident.1 6
Ramirez articulates the functional benefits of using this definition:
13. Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes, & Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining Racial Profiling
in a Post-September 11 World, 40 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1203-05 (2003) (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 1205.
15. Footnoting the modifier "inappropriate," Ramirez et al assert the particular importance
of distinguishing between the "inappropriate" use of race and the "illegal" use of race. Id. at
1205 n.43. "Circumstances under which we argue the use of race is inappropriate and therefore
constitutes racial profiling may very well be 'legal' according to the courts. See Brown v. City of
Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d. Cir. 2000) ('Yet our role is not to evaluate whether the police
action in question was the appropriate response under the circumstances, but to determine
whether what was done violated the Equal Protection Clause.'), amending and superseding 195
F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc denied, 235 F.3d 769 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
816 (2001)." Id.
16. Ramirez, supra note 13, at 1205.
5
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The first part of the definition prohibits law enforcement from using
race, ethnicity, or stereotypes as factors in selecting whom to stop,
search, or question. Instead, it focuses the police on the behavior of
the individual and requires more specificity to stop and search. When
law enforcement uses race as a signal for criminality in initiating law
enforcement actions, it results in ineffective law enforcement, strained
community relations, and violations of basic civil rights. By using
multi-layered profiles based on intelligence information and behav-
ioral factors, however, rather than simply casting the net broadly to
include just members of one race, one ethnicity, or one religion, police
can be more probative and can more effectively focus their criminal
investigations on appropriate criminal suspects. Both in the pre-Sep-
tember 11 and post-September 11 contexts, the use of race alone, or
even as a component in creating a criminal profile designed to prevent
future crime, reduces the effectiveness of law enforcement.' 7
Aligning with the many subsequent commentators who have under-
taken racially empirical studies of traffic stops, arrests, and convic-
tions, I adopt these scholars' approach because in the eight years since
the appearance of this ground-breaking, aftermath-of-9/11 article,
their projections as to these definitions' utility have been validated."
Like racial profiling, racism also has been defined in a variety of
ways.1 9 For clarity of exposition, this essay adopts Phyllis A. Katz's
widely accepted definition of racism: the differential treatment of indi-
viduals on the basis of their racial group membership. 20 Hereinafter, I
17. Id. at 1205-06.
18. To be sure, a number of economic studies empiricize racial profiling. See, e.g., Vani K.
Borooah, Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis, 17 EUR. J. OF POL.
EcoN. 17, 32-33 (2001) (estimating a model using data on stops and searches in ten separate
areas in England); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Econom-
ics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U.
Cm1. L. REv. 1275, 1286-97, 1354-71 (2004) (dividing empirical racial profiling scholarship into
"economics" and "civil liberties" strains and then providing a theoretical economic model of
racial profiling that maps out whether racial profiling is rational, and which population should be
profiled, using a series of potential elasticities and offending rate parameters); Rubin Her-
nandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate
Data, 45 INT'L. ECON. REv. 959, 960 (2004) (analyzing situations in which aggregate, rather than
individual-level, data is available); Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Using Hit Rates to Test for
Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10,947, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W10947 (adopting a
statistical approach to allow for heterogeneous police and motorists); Dhammika Dharmapala &
Stephen L. Ross, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicles Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence, 3
CONTRIUrrIoNs To ECON. ANALYSIs & POL'Y, No. 1, art. 12 (2004), at 4-7, available at http://
www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/issl/artl2/ (accounting for the fact that potential of-
fenders can bypass the highway altogether, thus avoiding detection).
19. See BENJAMIN P. BOWSER, INTRODUCTION To RACISM AND ANTi-RAcIsM IN WORLD
PERSPECTIVE, x-xii (1995).
20. TOwARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976). See also Faye
Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and Prejudice: A
Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 546 (1980) ("Racism may be examined at two levels:
One may measure discriminatory behavior, and one may infer prejudiced attitudes. Stereotyp-
6
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refer to both the appropriate and inappropriate uses of race by police
as "racial profiling;" however, I modify the term with either "appro-
priate" or "inappropriate," depending on whether the use of race,
ethnicity, or national origin, rather than behavior or individualized
suspicion, is based upon specific, concrete evidence linking race to a
particular person or particular criminal incident. I assert, moreover,
that inappropriate racial profiling is racist.
II. APPLYING TERMS TO ACTUAL PRACTICES
"Presumption of Guilt" is replete with powerful contemporary ac-
counts of blacks' encounters with police officers, including traffic
stops, searches, and all kinds of other apprehensions.2 1 The Los An-
geles area alone, despite being the home of the 1992 riot over law-
enforcement racism against blacks, provides fertile ground even to-
day.2 2 There is the 2009 story of Voltaire Rico Sterling, a black actor,
writer, attorney, and educator, who was followed for a long time and
then stopped by two white police officers in his Beverly Hills commu-
nity simply for "driving while [b]lack."2 3 And then there is the depic-
tion of years of prominent Los Angeles attorney Michael Lawson's
being stopped and interrogated while traveling in cars with black-male
friends or white or light-skinned black women because "the Los An-
geles Police Department in particular . . . made a regular practice of
profiling young Black men."24 Ogletree also notes the origin of the
term "Driving While Black," from none other than the late Johnnie L.
Cochran, Jr., who in the early 1980s, while driving his Rolls Royce on
the highway, was pulled over, his young son and daughter shattered to
watch as their innocent father had guns drawn on him as white police
officers asked him to step out of his car.25
These episodes in the book are regarded as racial profiling, and in
the broadest sense of the word, they are.26 But fundamentally, what
these stops were about was inappropriate racial profiling, or more pre-
cisely, racism.27 Whites treated black men differently from the way
they treated other whites simply because they were black. Such ra-
cism gives appropriate racial profiling, which appears to make black
communities safer, a bad name. But what does appropriate racial pro-
ing, which involves the presumption of certain attributes in an individual solely on the basis of
racial groups, is one form of prejudice." (Citations omitted)).
21. See generally OGLETREE, supra note 5.
22. Id. at 12-13.
23. Id. at 149-51.
24. Id. at 136.
25. Id. at 140.
26. Id. at 131.
27. Id. at 124-6.
7
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filing look like? "Presumption of Guilt" contains what, according to
the definitions offered in Section I, could serve as a textbook example
of appropriate racial profiling.2 8
However, this episode of Maryland State Police officers' profiling
that was challenged in the courts, and that is being re-examined judi-
cially today because a settlement has not resulted in sufficiently re-
formed policing, is presented in the book as inappropriate racial
profiling.2 9 The stop involved Robert Wilkins, a Washington lawyer
who had driven with relatives across the country for his maternal
grandfather's funeral in Chicago in 1992. While returning on a 12-
hour journey to the Washington area in a rented Cadillac just before 6
a.m. on Interstate 68 in downtown Cumberland, Maryland, he and
some relatives were pulled over by Officer V.W. Hughes."o The of-
ficer said he had paced the car at 60 m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. zone. 3 1 Af-
ter Wilkins's cousin Scott, the driver, provided the usual credentials,
the officer asked to search the car.3 2 Conferring with the driver's fa-
ther and Wilkins, the driver decided not to sign the "Consent to
Search" form that Hughes had given Scott. After some back and
forth and Wilkins's explanation that there could be no search without
and arrest and that, furthermore, Scott had done nothing to create
probable cause for an arrest, the officer told the family that they
would have to wait until a dog came to sniff the car and he would not
let them go, and after 30 minutes, the officer also told them that they
would have to get out of the car for a search.34 Despite Wilkins's ap-
peal not to have to get out in the rainy weather and his explanation
that they had been at a funeral and driving all night, and despite his
showing the officer an obituary, the officer persisted. 35 Two more of-
ficers appeared, and a German shepherd sniffed everything in and out
of the car, finding no indication of any contraband, drugs, or anything
else.3 6 After this procedure ended, Sgt. Brown from the Alleghany
County Sheriff's Department, who had brought the dog, permitted the
family to leave.
28. See Ramirez, supra note 13 (defining racial profiling).
29. See OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 102-07 for the facts of the Robert Wilkins case.
30. Id. at 102-03.
31. Id. at 103.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 104.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. Wilkins arrived in Washington too late for his court appearance. Id.
8
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Wilkins, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, sued
the Maryland State Police for profiling." In the heart of "Presump-
tion of Guilt," Ogletree explains the reasoning behind the lawsuit:
[T]he ACLU wanted to examine the legal basis for the stop and ways
to keep it from happening to other innocent citizens. As a result of
the filing of the lawsuit, Robert and his counsel ultimately received
the criminal intelligence report for the Maryland state police. Accord-
ing to Robert, the report discussed the problem of crack cocaine in the
Cumberland, Maryland, area and advised Maryland troopers that traf-
fickers "were predominantly black males and black females." The re-
port indicated that "these dangerous armed traffickers generally
traveled early in the morning or late at night along Interstate 68, and
that they favored rental cars with Virginia registration." Having trav-
eled on 1-68 early in the morning, in a Virginia rental car, Robert and
his family fit this broad profile. The problem, of course, is that no one
in the car was dangerous, and certainly no one had any drugs or
weapons.3
Though the account suggests that the criminal intelligence report
supports a claim of inappropriate racial profiling, this report would
appear to certify the actions of the police as not racist. As Professor
Ramirez et al explained, the use of race is not inappropriate if law
enforcement has specific, concrete evidence linking race to a particu-
lar person or particular criminal incident.4 0 Moreover, the Maryland
state police, in seeking to fight the crack-cocaine epidemic that was
ravaging black communities in the early 1990s, was following public
policy endorsed by the majority of the Congressional Black Caucus,
who voted for draconian punishment for crack-cocaine possession and
dealing.4 1
In 1986, when the federal law imposing extremely harsh sentences
appeared, most of the Congressional Black Caucus favored federal
sentencing disparities with respect to crimes involving crack on the
one hand and powder cocaine on the other.4 2 Were the majority of
the members of the Congressional Black Caucus engaged in inappro-
priate racial profiling? Were they racist? Of course not. They were
38. Id. at 106.
39. Id.
40. Ramirez, supra note 13, at 1205.
41. Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the Law of Un-
intended Consequences, 28 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 943 n.59 (2001) (citing Stephen Breyer, Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, An Address Before the University of Nebraska College of
Law (Nov. 18, 1998)), in 11 FED. SENTENCING REP., February 1999, at 180 (noting that a major-
ity of members of the Congressional Black Caucus supported mandatory minimum sentences for
drug crimes in the 1980s).
42. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Is Everything Race?, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 1, 1996, at
A18 (noting that "eleven of the then twenty black members of the Congress supported" the 1986
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which codified the 100-to-1 crack to powder cocaine sentencing
disparity).
9
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engaged in appropriate racial profiling designed to make communities
safer for blacks and everybody else. This is an important point, not-
withstanding that legislation's unintended consequence of criminaliz-
ing a considerable portion of a generation of black men.43
Professor Randall Kennedy has argued that critics who claim the
criminal justice system is racially discriminatory because it has incar-
cerated a disproportionate number of African-Americans are mis-
guided to the extent that, while liberal criticism of the criminal justice
system has traditionally focused on the disparate harms inflicted on
black defendants or suspects by law enforcement officials, other black
citizens-the "law-abiding"-are benefited by the incarceration of
large numbers of black criminals, because most crime is intraracial."
Kennedy maintains that the racially disparate results of the criminal
justice system do not harm black citizens as a class inasmuch as only a
lawbreaking subset of that class is harmed, while a law-abiding subset
is benefited; and because the system benefits some black citizens while
burdening others, Kennedy argues, the system does not discriminate
on the basis of race.45
Nevertheless, the Wilkins matter made its way through the Mary-
land courts, and in 1993, Wilkins's case was settled, with his being
awarded $50,000 in damages plus $46,000 in attorney's fees for the
three years of litigation. 4 6 The state also agreed to no longer use race-
based drug courier profiles as law-enforcement tools, and a new Mary-
land state police policy would prohibit race as a factor in determining
whom to stop, detain, or search without further evidence, plus a host
of other safeguards against racially discriminatory practices. 47 How-
ever, Ogletree reveals, "[m]ore than a decade after his encounter with
the police, Wilkins again brought suit against the Maryland state po-
lice, asserting that the practices of racial profiling continued and that
court intervention was warranted to change these persistent discrimi-
natory practices."48
43. See Breyer, supra note 41.
44. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1260 n.20 (1994), summarized and critiqued in David Cole, The Paradox of
Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's 'Politics of Distinction,' 83 GEO. L.J. 2547,
2571 (1995). But see Norm Parish, Blacks Say Profiling of Arabs is Racism; Polls Show Many
Favor Scrutiny After Hijackings, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl. ("Troubled by
polls showing support for racial profiling in the wake of Sept. 11, National Urban League presi-
dent Hugh Price stated, 'We should see in these polls' findings more evidence of the pernicious-
ness of racial profiling itself, no matter how it's seemingly bolstered by glib or urgently declared
rationalizations . . .. These polls show that whenever people speak up in favor of racial profiling,
they always favor its use against some other group, not theirs."')
45. Cole, supra note 44.
46. Id. at 106-07.
47. Id. at 107.
48. Id. at 108.
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On the other hand, Wilkins's litigation exposed clear racism on an-
other interstate highway patrolled by Maryland state police.49 In the
state of Maryland, the police reports indicated that 70 to 75 percent of
people searched on Interstate 95 - the busy highway linking Rich-
mond, Va., Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Md., Wilmington, Del., Phil-
adelphia, Pa., New York City, and other East Coast cities - were
blacks, even though blacks represented only 17 percent of those driv-
ing on the highway and only 17 percent of traffic violators.5 0 By the
same token, Ogletree reports that the Maryland state police would
search over 400 African Americans compared to 100 whites to find
similar numbers of individuals with drugs or other contraband.5 '
Ogletree concludes, "It was clear that a disproportionate number of
African Americans were stopped and searched without any valid
basis." 52
Notwithstanding the aim of the Wilkins litigation in ending racial
profiling, one useful change in the "persistent discriminatory prac-
tices" could have been made as soon as this black-white enforcement
disparity was found to be in dissonance with the reality of white crimi-
nality during his first lawsuit. If appropriate racial profiling is consti-
tutionally permissible and appropriate public policy, then the
increased likelihood of white lawlessness apparent on the examined
stretch of Maryland roadway would appear to justify substantial in-
creases in racial profiling of white motorists by the Maryland police -
profiling that would be deemed appropriate according to the terminol-
ogy set forth in this essay.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the debates of the 1990s over drugs, policing, and civil rights,
a body of scholarship has drawn upon the data collected as a result of
important challenges like Wilkins's. 54 Ogletree identifies the resultant
findings as "provid[ing] documented instances of racial profiling ...
49. OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 107.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Unfortunately, however, the seminal, and current, research analyzing discrimination
lawsuits' effects on changing police conduct seems to confirm Wilkins's experience that even a
settlement agreement containing monitoring can be flouted by policing agencies hell-bent on
acting out their racial biases against blacks. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and
Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1023 (2010). Focused on the role of lawsuits in organizational decisionmaking, Professor
Schwartz's empirical research includes a detailed study of the ways in which law enforcement
agencies gather and analyze information from lawsuits that have been brought against them.
Schwartz exposes serious information failures that often prevent informed decisionmaking,
showing that litigation information is used only in rare instances by law enforcement agencies.
54. See Id.
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[and] paint[ing] a much darker, more troubling picture of a criminal
justice system teeming with racial imbalance."" Professor Barne, for
example, in 2005 investigated the costs and benefits of racial profiling
in the context of drug interdiction.5 6 She reviewed the empirical eco-
nomic and civil rights literature regarding the existence and rationality
of racial profiling and then built an explicit model of a trooper's deci-
sion to search a stopped vehicle.5 ' Estimating the model using stop
and search data from a portion of Interstate 95 in Maryland, she found
that the Maryland state police use the motorist's race as a factor in
deciding which stopped vehicles to search." This result persists even
after controlling for many other descriptive variables that influence
the trooper's decision to search, she found.59 She then introduced an
additional model controlling for race's role in the search decision and
estimates the counterfactual: the change in the amount of drugs the
police would find if they ignored race as a factor in the search deci-
sion.6 0 Applying that model, she concluded that race is the strongest
predictor of identifying drug traffickers, but that racial profiling comes
at significant cost, as black motorists who are subject to search are
also more likely to be innocent than their white counterparts.6 1
Clearly the discussion of when appropriate racial profiling crosses the
line into racism, and how aggregate data is to inform law enforcement
policy and policing practices, is complex, no matter how clearly the
individual stories can be categorized as one or the other.6 2
Throughout his career, Ogletree has distilled lessons from such
complexity, addressing the topics of race, class, and justice with the
view of proposing ways to generate more dialogue and understanding
and less fear to instill more respect between citizens and law enforce-
ment.63 Presumption of Guilt is an invaluable, fresh contribution pre-
cisely because it catalogues not fewer than 102 instances of upstanding
black men's race-based run-ins with law enforcement.6 4
Gates's arrest requires such comparative analysis because his plight
on that sunny summer day in Cambridge, Mass., is the plight of mil-
55. Id. at 110-11.
56. Katherine Y. Barne, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction
Absent Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2005).
57. Id. at 1089.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1089-90.
61. Id. at 1090.
62. Charles H. Ramsey, Chief, Keynote Address at the 1998 New Jersey Law Enforcement
Summit, Overcoming Fear, Building Partnerships: Toward a New Paradigm in Police-Commu-
nity Race Relations (Dec. 11, 1998) (transcript available at http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/cwp/view,a,
1247,a,549769.asp).
63. OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 11.
64. OGLETREE, supra note 5.
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lions of other black men in America subject to racist policing. Here
was a uniquely 21st century tragedy occurring at the intersection of
race, crime, class, and the law: an innocent black man of highest dis-
tinction, in his home, intentionally arrested, handcuffed, booked, and
sanctioned by white law enforcement as a criminal." As Ogletree ul-
timately argues, if we are to move forward as a nation, we must ex-
amine not only what happened to Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
on July 16, 2009, but we must also examine what we can and must do,
individually and collectively, to develop a justice system that is truly
committed to the presumption of innocence.66
65. Black males on Harvard property have long endured such treatment at the hands of
white officers. E.g., Amos Jones, How Does One Defend Charging a Black Resident of Harvard
Housing with Trespassing in His Own House? Apparently, by Remaining Silent, HARV. L. RE-
CORD, Dec. 9, 2005, available at http://www.hlrecord.org/2.4462/amos-s-sermon-how-does-one-
defend-charging-a-black-resident-of-harvard-housing-with-trespassing-in-his-own-house-appar-
ently-by-remaining-silent-1.578937.
66. OGLETREE, supra note 5, at 13.
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